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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet can be a major catalyst for the potential damage of defamatory 
statements and privacy revelations.  The reach, permanence, and accessibility of 
Internet-posted information amplify the potential for harm and offense.1  Likewise, 
technological changes, shifting journalistic trends, and the reality that anyone in the 
Internet era is a “content creator wielding immense power to destroy another person’s 
privacy” push the boundaries between press freedom and personal privacy rights.2  
Similarly, the availability of new digital platforms allows individuals the power to 
shape their images in novel ways.  Some scholars suggest that this power allows for 
a “growing ‘claims consciousness’ around personal image.”3  As opportunities for 
shaping one’s image have grown in the digital age, so have opportunities for 
damaging the reputation of oneself or another.4  Relatedly, such developments have 
prompted greater public acceptance of bringing lawsuits.5 
Following the publication of a story involving two women accusing Donald 
Trump of inappropriately touching them years ago, Marc E. Kasowitz, Donald 
Trump’s lawyer, demanded that The New York Times retract the story, or face legal 
action.6  Fortunately, such demands do not appear to intimidate The Times.  In fact, 
the newspaper invited the threatened action, standing by the legality of its publication 
and welcoming “the opportunity to have a court set [Donald Trump] straight.”7 
Not all presses, however, enjoy The Times’s deep pockets, legal expertise, or 
history of success in libel cases.8  Though the threat of expensive litigation draining 
editorial resources is not new,9 Peter Thiel’s vengeful involvement in the Gawker 
suit and Frank VanderSloot’s alleged creation of a litigation fund to finance lawsuits 
against a particular type of media constitute dangerous examples of billionaires 
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 1. Clay Calvert, Panel III: The Future of the Press and Privacy, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y 119, 122 
(2014). 
 2. Id. at 119. 
 3. SAMANTHA BARBAS, LAWS OF IMAGE:  PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN AMERICA 200 (2015). 
 4. Emma Altheide, Arbitration for the “Afflicted” – the Viability of Arbitrating Defamation and 
Libel Claims Considering Ipso’s Pilot Program, 2017 J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 170 (2017). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Alan Rappeport, Donald Trump Threatens To Sue The Times over Article on Unwanted 
Advances, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/W9UM-UND2.   
 7. Id. 
 8. THE NEW YORK TIMES has not lost a libel suit in the United States since at least the early 1960s. 
See Liz Spayd, A Rare Libel Suit Against The Times, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/PRT6-
9NRT. 
 9. See Green v. Alton Tel. Printing Co., 438 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
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sponsoring lawsuits against media they dislike.10  Today’s media climate, 
characterized by increased access, new journalistic styles, and a growing “claims 
consciousness,” coupled with the possibility of wealthy third-party litigation 
financiers utilizing the judicial system to target and weaken media outlets, warrants 
strong protections in the form of a federal anti-SLAPP law. 
This Note lays out the judicial protections granted to the traditional press and 
identifies new threats to non-traditional presses through the rise of third-party 
litigation financing for lawsuits targeting negative reporting.  Part I distinguishes 
between libel and privacy lawsuits, explaining why one approach—particularly in 
the digital age—can be more fruitful for plaintiffs.  Part I also draws from recent 
Supreme Court precedent to contextualize current attitudes regarding speech and 
privacy.  Part II analyzes two recent new media cases with troubling results:  
specifically, million-dollar costs at best, and bankruptcy at worst.  While ample 
protections exist for the traditional press, in light of these lawsuits, it is worth 
considering what more could and should be done to protect media outlets, especially 
the non-traditional presses.  Part II also examines the chilling effect of potential 
billionaire-backed lawsuits.  Because of threats from third-party litigation financiers 
and because judicial protections are intended for traditional presses, new publishers 
are left in a precarious position; Part III advocates for a federal anti-SLAPP law as a 
potential solution. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE LEGAL CONTEXT PRESIDING OVER THE 
DIGITAL SPEECH SPACE 
This section briefly explains the development of defamation and privacy law.  It 
distinguishes between the two types of lawsuits, clarifying why one approach, 
especially in the digital age, can be more productive for plaintiffs.  This section also 
contextualizes the Supreme Court’s recent views on different types of speech.  In 
particular, it draws attention to the Court’s reluctance to make rules differentiating 
between types of media, as well as its recognition of digital media as an important 
new space for speech.  Together, these subsections reveal additional factors affecting 
contemporary media outlets in the digital space. 
 
 10. See Luisa Kroll & Kerry A. Dolan, Forbes 400: The Definitive Ranking of the Wealthiest 
Americans, #328 Peter Thiel, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/GP79-MPAV; id. at #172 Frank 
VanderSloot, https://perma.cc/53CZ-KDJE; Matt Drange, Peter Thiel’s War on Gawker: A Timeline, 
FORBES (June 21, 2016); VanderSloot Starts Fund To Defend Conservatives Against Defamation, IDAHO 
ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/Z9KS-7TFM. 
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A. DEFAMATION LAW 
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, arguably the 
most significant libel11 case in contemporary American history.12  Following the 
publication of an advertisement titled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” which called 
attention to the “wave of terror” facing Southern African-American students 
engaging in non-violent demonstrations and criticized Montgomery’s brutal 
response to the protests, L.B. Sullivan, one of the three elected Commissioners of the 
City of Montgomery, sued The New York Times and four African-American 
clergymen for libel.13  Under Alabama law at the time, Sullivan was not required to 
prove that he had been harmed.  The only defense available to The Times was the 
truthfulness of the advertisement.  Because the advertisement contained factual 
errors, intent was presumed.14  A local jury awarded Sullivan $500,000, and the 
Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.15 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the Alabama courts 
had failed to provide the First Amendment protections required by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.16  The Court established the landmark “actual malice” 
standard, integral to proving intent in libel actions brought by a public official against 
critics of his or her official conduct.  This standard requires public officials to prove 
that the publisher knew the statement was false, or that the publisher had acted with 
reckless disregard to the statement’s truth or falsity.17  In this way, the standard 
focuses on the subjective state of mind of journalists rather than on some established 
standard of professional responsibility.  The same standard also applies to cases 
concerning defamatory criticism of public figures.18 
Considered “against the backdrop of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,”19 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan set a crucial precedent for American 
defamation law.  Justice Brennan emphasized the “breathing space” for error 
necessary to prevent self-censorship.20  This “breathing space” differentiates 
American libel law from its British counterpart.  Under British law, any mistake 
justifies a judgment for the plaintiff if the statement materially injures his or her 
 
 11. Libel is one type of defamation. While defamation encompasses false claims of fact about a 
person, libel refers to such claims that take written or permanent form. Slander, on the other hand, refers 
to such claims made through verbal statements or gestures.  See Defamation FAQs, MEDIA L. RESOURCE 
CTR., https://perma.cc/8BG9-ZBRR (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 12. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 13. Id. at 256. 
 14. Anna Stolley Persky, 50 Years After New York Times v. Sullivan, Do Courts Still Value 
Journalists’ Watchdog Role?, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 2014), https://perma.cc/2854-UFVJ. 
 15. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. 
 16. Id. at 254. 
 17. Id. at 279–80. 
 18. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 19. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 721. 
 20. Id. at 271–72 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)); id. at 279. 
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reputation.21  British law requires newspapers to prove that a challenged statement is 
true, which results in almost universal losses for newspapers that go to court to 
defend a libel suit.22  Under Sullivan, the Supreme Court shifted the burden of proof 
to public official plaintiffs pursuing libel cases.  In doing so, the Court enlarged the 
scope of First Amendment protection for journalists. 
Rather than granting absolute immunity for any speech relating to an individual’s 
official conduct, the Court instead allowed for liability for speech involving knowing 
or reckless falsehood, thereby balancing the interests of upholding free expression 
and protecting reputation.23  Anthony Lewis, a current columnist for The New York 
Times and the reporter that covered New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, underscores the 
great weight that reputation carries in the American value system.24  In particular, 
Lewis notes that people previously responded to libel and slander with duel 
challenges.25  The everlasting significance of reputation appears relevant today.  One 
could argue that expensive lawsuits function as the modern-day equivalent of such 
challenges. 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court determined the constitutionally 
permissible standard for intent in libel actions brought by private individuals.26  The 
Court held that private individuals deserve more protection from defamatory 
accusations than do public officials and public figures, so the “actual malice” 
standard does not apply in their cases.  The Court left the decision as to the proper 
standard to the states, with one caveat:  they may not impose liability without fault.27  
The Court emphasized the equitable nature of this decision as it “recognizes the 
strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for 
wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the 
rigors of strict liability for defamation.”28  In most states, private plaintiffs must only 
show the defendant’s negligence.29  While New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
eliminated strict liability from defamation cases involving public officials and public 
figures, Gertz eliminated liability without fault from defamation cases involving 
private individuals.30 
B. PRIVACY LAW 
While both the Supreme Court and Congress have described privacy as a 
fundamental right for certain purposes, no general constitutional or statutory right to 
 
 21. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 157 
(1991). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 154. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974). 
 27. Id. at 347–48. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Defamation FAQs, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR., https://perma.cc/YMF4-797P.  
 30. 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 
13:10 (2d ed. 2018). 
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privacy exists under federal or state law.31  Rather, certain specific privacy rights or 
interests exist in defined areas.32  Further, the Supreme Court has stated that 
protection of an individual’s general right to privacy falls largely under the purview 
of the states.33  Nearly every state recognizes the right to privacy to some extent, 
either by statute or by common law, but the way in which each state defines the legal 
elements of a claim and the corresponding scope of protection vary.34 
Notably, the first major theoretical discussion of the right to privacy was a 
response to concerns about journalistic invasions of individual privacy.  Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis began the conversation in their 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article titled The Right to Privacy.35  Concerned with press intrusion into 
personal and family life, as well as the prevalence of “yellow journalism,” Warren 
and Brandeis argued that the common law should be read to protect the right to 
privacy.36  By analyzing a series of prior decisions that granted relief on the bases of 
defamation, property, breach of confidence, and implied contract, they concluded 
that while these decisions did not sufficiently protect against invasions of privacy, 
they were based on a broader principle of the right to privacy that deserved its own 
recognition.37 
While Warren and Brandeis popularized privacy in American law, William 
Prosser was its “chief architect.”38  Prosser clarified the concept of the “right to 
privacy” by categorizing it into four related, but discrete privacy torts.39  They 
include:  intrusion upon seclusion; public disclosure of private facts (also known as 
publicity given to private life); false light publicity; and appropriation of name or 
likeness.40  As the chief reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts, Prosser 
codified his conception of privacy law within it.41  Today the Restatement serves as 
the leading authority on the subject matter to which most courts refer.42 
Intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts constitute the 
privacy torts most central to this Note.  Under the Second Restatement of Torts, 
intrusion upon seclusion provides liability for one who “intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private 
affairs or concerns” in a manner that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
 
 31. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 631, 636 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) and the Privacy Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93–579 § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349–51 (1967). 
 34. Practical Law Intellectual Property & Technology, Right of Privacy: Overview, Practical Law 
Practice Note Overview w-009-4039, WESTLAW (UK) (2018). 
 35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 36. Id. at 213. 
 37. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 384 (1960). 
 38. Neil M. Richards & David K. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1887, 1887–88 (2010). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Prosser, supra 37 at 389. 
 41. Richards & Solove, supra note38 at 1890. 
 42. Id. 
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person.”43  The Comments to the Restatement clarify that intrusion upon seclusion 
does not depend on any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded, but 
deals only with an interference with one’s solitude or seclusion.44 
Public disclosure of private facts provides liability for one who “gives publicity 
to a matter concerning the private life of another . . . if the matter publicized is of a 
kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of a 
legitimate concern to the public.”45  The second prong is often referred to as 
newsworthiness.  Unlike intrusion upon seclusion, which concerns the way in which 
information is obtained, public disclosure of private facts concerns the nature of the 
information and the manner in which it is divulged. 
Newsworthiness is integral to invasion of privacy lawsuits and proves especially 
relevant here, as it serves as a defense to legal causes of action for public disclosure 
of private facts.  In 1975, the San Francisco Chronicle commended Oliver Sipple’s 
bravery after he foiled an assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford.46  In the 
process, the newspaper divulged that Sipple was gay, and the revelation permeated 
the national news.47  Sipple sued the newspaper for invasion of privacy, claiming 
publicity given to private life.48  The Superior Court in San Francisco dismissed the 
case because the record failed to state a triable issue of fact and the decision was 
affirmed on appeal.49   
Though Sipple’s sexual orientation was not yet known in his hometown of Detroit, 
the Court determined that information regarding his sexual orientation was not 
private since he was well-known in the San Francisco gay community.50  Moreover, 
it clarified that involuntary fame is not a defense, so even though Sipple may not 
have intended to enter the limelight when he chose to save the President, through his 
conduct he became a legitimate subject of public interest.51  Given the circumstances, 
the Court determined that the information disclosed regarding Sipple’s background 
and sexual orientation was newsworthy.52   
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established the “actual malice” standard, 
plaintiffs have struggled to win libel cases.53  However, unlike in defamation cases, 
where the plaintiff must prove falsity or actual malice, plaintiffs in invasion of 
privacy cases do not have to meet such onerous burdens of proof.  For example, in 
publicity given to private life claims, like that made in Sipple, plaintiffs must prove 
only that the publicized matter is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a 
 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. a (1977). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 46. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1043–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1044. 
 49. Id. at 1050. 
 50. Id. at 1049. 
 51. Id. at 1049–50. 
 52. Id. at 1048–50. 
 53. David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible 
Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1209 (1995). 
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reasonable person, and that it is not newsworthy.54  George Freeman, the Executive 
Director of the Media Law Resource Center, explained that “we have always felt that 
privacy was a more fruitful ground for plaintiffs to sow,” especially since “the whole 
celebrity culture gives rise to more of these issues.”55  Libel and privacy’s different 
requirements lend support to the idea that invasion of privacy claims can be more 
effective for plaintiffs.   
C. THE BLURRY LINE BETWEEN THE TWO 
Though courts have found in favor of the press on the issue of newsworthiness, 
these decisions are often fact-specific in nature and cannot be relied on too heavily 
by publishers today.  Like the court in Sipple, the Supreme Court found in favor of 
the press on the issue of newsworthiness in its 2001 Bartnicki v. Vopper decision.  
That is, the Court found no liability when a radio commentator broadcast a telephone 
conversation covertly recorded by a third party.56  The conversation, involving a 
teachers’ union negotiator’s discussion of the possibility of using violence to 
influence a school board, was deemed sufficiently newsworthy to outweigh the 
callers’ privacy.57  In fact, the Court clarified that “privacy concerns give way when 
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”58   
However, the Court construed the issue narrowly, deciding only the degree of 
protection the First Amendment provides to speech that discloses the contents of a 
communication intercepted illegally.59  Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens 
explained the narrow construction, asserting that it aligns with the Court’s reluctance 
to demarcate firmly between the First Amendment and privacy law and “answer 
categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the 
First Amendment.”60  Stevens continued:  “We continue to believe that the sensitivity 
and significance of the interests presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment 
and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly 
than the appropriate context of the instant case.”61  As follows, Bartnicki reveals the 
fact-specific nature of the analysis required when considering the newsworthiness of 
the information in relation to a subject’s privacy interests.  Moreover, the case 
highlights the blurry divide between unacceptable invasions of privacy and 
acceptable speech on matters of public concern.  Illustrating the degree of uncertainty 
in this area, Bartnicki should not be viewed by publishers as an assurance of a court’s 
likelihood of finding newsworthiness in the future.   
Further complicating this area is the fact that publishers may have reason to be 
wary of courts’ newsworthiness analysis.  According to Amy Gajda, law professor 
 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 55. Jeffrey Toobin, Gawker’s Demise and the Trump-Era Threat to the First Amendment, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/4RKE-786J. 
 56. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 57. Id. at 534–35. 
 58. Id. at 534. 
 59. Id. at 517. 
 60. Id. at 529. 
 61. Id. (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532–33 (1989)). 
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at Tulane University Law School and author of The First Amendment Bubble:  How 
Privacy and the Paparazzi Threaten a Free Press, in the past, courts tended to defer 
to the press regarding what was newsworthy.62  But today, the courts’ implicit trust 
in the media demonstrated by previous rulings might not extend to website operators 
of non-traditional media.63  Gajda argues that courts now view newsworthiness “in a 
dangerously subjective way to show that today’s Internet-based media sometimes 
doesn’t have the same ethics constraints as more mainstream media, leading to a 
more judgmental bench eager to question news value.”64  Despite its ultimate pro-
press holding, Bartnicki’s narrow construction sheds light on Gajda’s argument and 
warrants caution in the digital age. 
D. MEDIA NEUTRALITY 
In addition to the blurry line between defamation and privacy law, the Court has 
been reluctant to carve out certain types of media for special treatment.  As a result, 
this makes it difficult to predict how the Court will respond to the growing threats to 
non-traditional presses.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 
particular provides an important example of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to 
make rules distinguishing between different types of media.  In Citizens United, the 
Court not only held that corporations have the same First Amendment rights as 
natural persons, but it also clarified that the institutional press does not enjoy any 
constitutional privilege in addition to that which is extended to other speakers.65   
Rodney A. Smolla, First Amendment scholar and current dean of Widener 
University Delaware Law School, asserts that the highly volatile nature of modern 
media is partly responsible for this reluctance.66  Citing Citizens United, Smolla 
argues that “rapid changes in technology, business models for information and 
communications companies, and changes in cultural habit” contribute to this 
volatility.67  Smolla highlights the Court’s acknowledgement of how technological 
developments shape and characterize today’s speech:  “Our Nation’s speech dynamic 
is changing, and informative voices should not have to circumvent restrictions to 
exercise their First Amendment rights.  Speakers have become adept at presenting 
citizens with sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-
hour news cycle.”68   
The Court’s opinion in Citizens United acknowledges the role of corporations in 
national conversations:  “Corporations, like individuals, do not have monolithic 
views.  On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them 
the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the 
speech of candidates and elected officials.”69  By addressing the nature of 
 
 62. Toobin, supra note 55.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010). 
 66. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:14 (2d ed. 2018). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364. 
 69. Id. 
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contemporary speech and finding that corporate political speech should receive the 
same First Amendment protections as other speech, the decision illustrates the 
impartiality with which the Court addresses speech made by different media.70  In 
contrast to the concerns raised by the Court’s movement away from its traditional 
deference to the press, this impartiality appears encouraging to new media publishers 
in the digital age. 
Similarly, in Packingham v. North Carolina, a recent case in which the Supreme 
Court overturned North Carolina’s prohibition on sex offenders using social media, 
Justice Kennedy discussed social media’s role as one of today’s most important 
constitutional speech forums.  He explained that  
A fundamental First Amendment principle is that all persons have access to places 
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.  
Today, one of the most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly 
social media, which offers ‘relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication 
of all kinds,’ to users engaged in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on 
any number of diverse topics.71   
Kennedy acknowledged the novelty of the digital media space, advising courts to 
tread carefully in this arena.  He wrote,  
The Internet’s forces and directions are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that 
courts must be conscious that what they say today may be obsolete tomorrow.  Here, in 
one of the first cases the Court has taken to address the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the modern Internet, the Court must exercise extreme caution before 
suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast 
networks in that medium.72   
In doing so, Kennedy recognized the magnitude of speech made in the digital media 
arena and echoed Citizens United’s impartiality towards speech made in different 
media.  Whether it be due to the volatility of today’s media, a respect for cyberspace’s 
impact, or another reason, recent First Amendment Supreme Court decisions reveal 
the Court’s tendency to address speech protections in a media-neutral manner. 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court does not seem willing to draw a firm line 
between the First Amendment and privacy law, and instead remains committed to 
considering each case on an individual basis.  On the other, the Court appears media-
neutral in its views and has acknowledged the significant role social media plays 
today.  In this way, the preceding subsections shed light on the unique context in 
which this Note arises.  Specifically, third-party funded litigation targeting negative 
reporting arises in a digital age characterized by the Court’s tendency to blend First 
Amendment and privacy analysis, as well as its recognition of digital media as an 
important and novel—but not doctrinally distinct—space for speech.  These 
background factors influence my consideration of possible statutory fixes to the 
 
 70. 1 Smolla on Defamation, supra note 66, at § 3:11.  
 71. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (quoting Reno v. Am. Civ. 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)) (internal citation omitted). 
 72. Id. 
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problem by underscoring the need for clear mechanisms by which digital presses can 
quickly and effectively counter frivolous lawsuits at a time when it can be difficult 
to predict how the Supreme Court will respond to growing threats to non-traditional 
presses. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE 
DIGITAL SPEECH SPACE 
Below, I discuss two recent media cases with troubling results:  specifically, 
million-dollar costs at best and bankruptcy at worst.  Bollea v. Gawker and the 
Mother Jones litigation forewarn the ways in which billionaires can utilize the 
judicial system to intentionally weaken media outlets.73  In Gawker’s case, the 
method involved clandestine third-party litigation funding.  Mother Jones concerned 
an announcement regarding the creation of a fund to finance litigation targeting 
certain media outlets, namely the liberal press. 
A. BILLIONAIRES FINANCE LITIGATION TARGETING NEGATIVE REPORTING 
1. Gawker’s Expensive Loss in the Bollea v. Gawker Invasion of Privacy 
Lawsuit, Secretly Financed by Peter Thiel 
Bollea v. Gawker serves as a cautionary tale of a billionaire’s ability to utilize the 
judicial system to avenge a media outlet he or she dislikes.  Terry Bollea, a wrestling 
star known professionally as Hulk Hogan, became famous in the 1980s and since 
then developed into a pop-culture sensation.74  Gawker Media, an Internet media 
company, comprised a network of websites dedicated to “sports, feminism and 
gadgets among other things” and covered celebrity, media, and entertainment gossip, 
as well as criticism of mainstream news outlets and investigative reporting.75  Nick 
Denton, Gawker’s founder, stated that Gawker “published stories ahead of 
maintaining relationships with people, without access, favor, or discretion” and that 
it “cultivated an image as a publisher who always puts the story first, which can come 
across as being ruthless.”76  Naturally, this image produced a host of enemies.77 
The Gawker case centers on the leak of a covertly recorded video capturing a 2006 
sexual encounter between Hogan and Heather Clem.  At the time, Heather Clem was 
married to Hogan’s former best friend, Todd Clem, a radio personality who legally 
changed his name to Bubba the Love Sponge Clem.78  Bubba had hidden cameras 
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throughout his house and filmed Hogan’s engagement with Clem without his 
permission.79  In October 2012, a month after receiving the video from an anonymous 
source, Gawker published a minute and forty-second excerpt of it along with a 1400-
word essay written by former editor, A.J. Daulerio.80  As many as four million people 
watched the video, making it the third most-clicked story on Gawker that year.81 
Irritated by Gawker’s refusal to remove the video after numerous demands,82 
Hogan filed two invasion of privacy lawsuits, one in state court against Bubba and 
Heather Clem and the other in federal court against Gawker, Denton, and Daulerio.  
Hogan’s Amended Complaint against Gawker asserted legal causes of action for 
intrusion upon seclusion, publication of private facts, violation of the Florida 
common law right of publicity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.83 
After unsuccessfully seeking preliminary injunctions requiring Gawker to remove 
excerpts of the video, Hogan dropped the federal lawsuit.  Hogan amended his state 
court Initial Complaint by dropping Bubba as a defendant and adding Gawker in his 
place.  Gawker tried to remove the case to federal court but Hogan successfully filed 
a motion to remand it to state court.84  There the jury reached an unprecedented 
$140.1 million verdict.85 
Unlike Federal Judge James D. Wittemore, who found the video newsworthy and 
thus determined that Hogan had failed to overcome the presumption that the 
preliminary injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First 
Amendment, the jury determined the opposite.  Wittemore cited Hogan’s public 
persona, the publicity received from his reality television show, the inclusion of 
extramarital affair details in his book, prior reports by other parties of the video’s 
existence and content, and Hogan’s public discussion of issues relating to his 
marriage and sex life to assert the video’s newsworthiness.86  The jury, on the other 
hand, agreed with Hogan’s lawyer that the distinction between Terry Bollea, the 
individual, and Hulk Hogan, the pop-culture icon, made the video not newsworthy 
for Bollea’s purposes.87 
To appeal the $140.1 million verdict, the state court judge required that Gawker 
post a $50 million cash bond.88  Unable to do so, Gawker corporately filed for 
bankruptcy and put itself up for auction.89  Eventually Gawker Media sold its 
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websites to Univision Communications for $135 million and settled with Hogan by 
agreeing to shut down the Gawker site, pay $31 million out of the proceeds from the 
sale to Univision, and relinquish the opportunity to appeal.90 
Though speculation arose during the trial that a third-party funder might have 
been backing the case, only after did it come to light that billionaire venture capitalist 
Peter Thiel, a co-founder of PayPal and an early investor in Facebook, secretly 
financed the lawsuit.91  Thiel defended his financial support, explaining that Gawker 
had previously invaded his privacy and the privacy of others.92  Thiel described his 
support for the lawsuit, which totaled approximately $10 million, as “one of my 
greater philanthropic things.”93  He also asserted that he had helped those wronged 
by a “singularly terrible bully.”94 
Certain moves made throughout the litigation suggested that the case was about 
more than money and a sex tape.  For example, the decision to drop the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claim, which required Gawker’s insurance company 
to pay for its defense and contribute to a settlement, drew attention.95  By dropping 
the claim, Hogan’s legal team removed the insurance company from the equation 
and forced Gawker to shoulder more of the potential financial burden.  Hogan also 
rejected multiple offers of settlement and retried a number of claims he had lost on 
in federal court.96  Legal experts have emphasized the unusual nature of these 
strategic moves.97  Without Thiel’s financial backing, they may not have been 
possible. 
Thiel also admitted that he paid for a team of lawyers to find and help “victims” 
of Gawker’s coverage through litigation.98  In an interview, he explained that his 
efforts were “less about revenge and more about specific deterrence.”99   Regardless, 
Thiel’s actions underscore the ability of billionaires to use the judicial system to 
target and weaken media outlets.100 
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Bollea v. Gawker involved meritorious claims.  Neither party necessarily 
appeared sympathetic and many people, not just the celebrities it criticized, could 
reasonably have been happy to see Gawker’s reign come to an end.  However, the 
precedent set by Thiel’s tactics warrants concern.  As Floyd Abrams explained, Thiel 
has legitimized the notion that “somebody not involved in a case can for the purpose 
of destruction of a publication, fund a litigation which may, and in this case has, had 
the effect of destroying it.”101  NPR Media Correspondent, David Folkenflik, 
identified the crucial issue that perhaps best supports the adoption of a federal anti-
SLAPP law.  Specifically, Folkenflik asked what an independent publisher can do 
without the backing of a billionaire?102  Thiel effectively set the groundwork for 
others to follow to punish, deter, and weaken media companies.  As a result, other 
outlets may suffer similar fates if their journalistic style and content offend 
individuals with pockets as deep as Thiel’s. 
2. The Mother Jones’s Defamation Suit and Frank VanderSloot’s Fund for 
Future Lawsuits 
In addition to the threat of wealthy individuals financing litigation for the 
purposes of revenge or deterrence is the prospect of individuals creating funds to 
finance litigation against media outlets with which they disagree.  For example, 
Frank VanderSloot, Idaho’s wealthiest individual and founder and CEO of “wellness 
company” Melaleuca103 sued The Foundation for National Progress, the parent 
company of liberal magazine Mother Jones, and two of its employees, for 
defamation.104  The lawsuit concerned a 2012 Mother Jones article titled “Pyramid-
Like Company Ponies Up $1 Million for Mitt Romney,” which Melaleuca claimed 
malevolently damaged VanderSloot’s reputation. 
At issue were Mother Jones’s references to two “Community Page Ads” 
published by Melaleuca on June 5, 2005, and May 7, 2006, in the Idaho Falls Post-
Register titled “Responsible Journalism or Misleading Propaganda?” and “Post 
Register Attacks the Scouts Again! When Will It Stop?”105  These “Community Page 
Ads” followed the publication of a six-day series of articles titled “Scout’s Honor” 
that described pedophilia at a local Boy Scout’s camp.106  The advertisements drew 
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attention to the sexual orientation of the series’ author and suggested his inability to 
be impartial on the subject matter.  Mother Jones referred to these ads as support for 
its claim that VanderSloot is a controversial figure in Idaho politics, especially due 
to his stance on issues involving gays and lesbians.107 
Specifically, the article stated that “[i]n 2005, he [VanderSloot] took out full-page 
ads in his hometown newspaper, . . . the Post Register in Idaho Falls, publicly outing 
a reporter at the paper as gay” and “Vander Sloot’s ads bashed Zuckerman, claiming 
that his story was an effort to smear the Boy Scouts because the organization doesn’t 
allow gays in its membership.”108  VanderSloot and Melaleuca alleged that the 
quoted statements, as well as a similar statement (“In 2005, Vander Sloot took out 
full-page newspapers ads to out a local reporter as gay”) were defamatory.109  They 
contacted the Washington Chief Bureau of the magazine requesting retractions.110  
Mother Jones temporarily removed the article from its website and then reposted it 
with revisions.111 
After Mother Jones uploaded the revised version, VanderSloot and Melaleuca 
asserted that certain revised statements were defamatory.  These included the 
following:  “In 2005, he took out full-page ads in his hometown newspaper, the Post-
Register in Idaho Falls, attacking the paper and one of its reporters”; “VanderSloot’s 
ads bashed Zuckerman’s reporting, while noting that he was a gay man who had 
admitted in a story once that ‘it is very difficult for him to be objective on things he 
feels strongly’”; and “UPDATE:  The article reported previously published 
assertions that VanderSloot’s ad in the Post-Register outed reporter Peter 
Zuckerman.  In a letter to Mother Jones, Melaleuca general counsel Ryan Nelson 
maintains that the ad did not out Zuckerman because Zuckerman had discussed his 
homosexuality publicly while in school in Florida.  But Zuckerman’s boss as [sic] 
the paper, Dean Miller, has said that in Idaho Falls, Zuckerman ‘was not ‘out’ to 
anyone but family, a few colleagues at the paper (including me), and his close 
friends.”112  VanderSloot and Melaleuca then sent demands for a retraction of the 
revised article and a related tweet.113 
For a number of reasons, State court Judge Darla Williamson found for Mother 
Jones at summary judgment phase.  Among the issues raised were the nature of the 
contested statements and whether actual malice had been shown.114  Considering the 
context and statements at issue, Williamson determined that the statements appear 
more like objective fact than subjective hyperbole.115  They also constitute 
statements of opinion that cite to their sources and provide readers with the 
opportunity to form their own opinions.116  Further, given the broad interpretations 
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provided to the contested words “out,” “bash,” and “attack,” and the political context 
in which they were published, the words do not publicly disgrace or degrade 
VanderSloot such that they amount to defamation per se.117   
Though Mother Jones ultimately prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, 
the magazine explained that “the take-no-prisoners legal assault from VanderSloot 
and Melaleuca has consumed a good part of the past two and a half years and has 
cost millions (yes, millions) in legal fees.”118  VanderSloot revealed his pleasure with 
the outcome, stating, “I feel absolutely vindicated,” despite the holding in Mother 
Jones’s favor.119  Referring to Judge Williamson’s “Further Discussion,” in which 
she revealed her concern regarding Mother Jones’s style of journalism,120 
VanderSloot explained, “The judge gave us much more than a jury could have ever 
given us.  This case was never about money.  Our attempt was to vindicate our good 
name and to point out what type of sleazy journalism that Mother Jones put out to 
attack conservative positions.”121  Clearly, VanderSloot’s intention was not to win 
the case, but to punish and harm the publication.  VanderSloot also announced that 
he would create a fund to finance similar lawsuits by “people who have been defamed 
by Mother Jones magazine or other liberal press because of their conservative 
values.”122  Given the financial strain of the litigation, as well as its time and resource 
costs, this announcement signifies a cause for alarm. 
B. THE CHILLING EFFECT OF POSSIBLE BILLIONAIRE-BACKED LAWSUITS 
Regardless of the approach taken regarding negative reporting, namely a 
successful invasion of privacy suit or an unsuccessful libel suit, litigation can pose 
great financial strain on publishers.  This section raises additional concerns that 
contextualize the severity of the situation new media publishers find themselves in 
today.  Judicial protections for traditional presses cannot handle these particularized 
new attacks that profit from the deep pockets of their benefactors. 
Not all media outlets can withstand expensive judgments.  Take Alton Telegraph, 
for example.  In 1969, James Green, a real estate developer, alleged that the Alton 
Telegraph libeled him in a memorandum sent to the Justice Department official 
leading an investigation of organized crime in Illinois.  A jury awarded James Green 
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with $6.7 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages, 
forcing the Alton Telegraph to file for bankruptcy to prevent selling its assets.  
Though the newspaper ultimately reached a settlement of $1.4 million and stayed in 
business, its near destruction reveals how harmful a successful libel action can be to 
small media outlets.123 
However, the threat of successful libel action is not necessarily what influences 
publications.  Rather, it is the threat of any litigation.  The process by which parties 
reach a judgment in a libel action is large and expensive.124  This economic reality 
discourages some in the media from taking on stories or certain approaches to stories 
that they know might lead to litigation, even if they believe they can win.125  In fact, 
there may be a direct economic correlation between the costs of defense in media 
cases and the exercise of free speech rights by media outlets.126  The potential chilling 
effect has been discussed long before the Gawker and Mother Jones cases began.127  
In 1983, Rodney A. Smolla asserted the rejuvenation of libel law in America, and in 
1995 David Boies spoke about the chilling effects of libel defamation costs.128   
Yet the realized threat of billionaire litigation funders constitutes an even greater 
danger to media outlets in the digital age.  These outlets utilize different tones, 
incorporate new media, and put out accessible content at a rapid rate.  They also do 
not necessarily enjoy the deep pockets of more traditional presses.  Moreover, Boies 
explains that non-economic motives at play in defamation litigation prove 
particularly problematic for defendants since plaintiffs are less motivated by a 
quantifiable economic loss and less constrained by the economic costs of litigation 
than most potential plaintiffs.129  Like in Bollea v. Gawker, this can lead to strategic 
moves that require media outlets to shoulder great burdens and expend substantial 
finances and resources through prolonged litigation.  This reality can threaten the 
editorial independence media outlets enjoy.130 
For example, it appears that the American Bar Association (A.B.A.) declined to 
publish its report on Donald Trump’s litigation history for fear of being sued.131  
Commissioned by a committee of media lawyers at the A.B.A., the report analyzed 
seven free speech related lawsuits and determined that Trump was a “libel bully” 
who filed meritless lawsuits and never won in court.  Originally titled “Donald J. 
Trump is a Libel Bully but Also a Libel Loser,” the A.B.A. proposed the alternative 
title:  “Presidential Election Demonstrates Need for Anti-Slapp Laws.”  An A.B.A. 
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spokeswoman explained that they had simply made routine objections and edits, 
while committee members that wrote the report revealed their distress at the A.B.A.’s 
revisions.132 
Moreover, Jim DeRogatis, a Chicago rock critic, and the author of a story 
detailing how R&B singer R. Kelly psychologically and sexually controlled young 
women as if in a cult, had considerable difficulty finding an outlet to publish his 
piece.  When he tried to publish his story, multiple media organizations seemed 
interested initially but backed out at the last minute.133  DeRogatis explained that 
Gawker often came up in conversation when the organizations conveyed their 
hesitation.134  Though Buzzfeed ultimately published the story after ensuring its 
accuracy, the fact that media organizations feared taking the risk to publish a 
groundbreaking story that had been reported on for months underscores potential 
litigation’s chilling effect.135 
III. A FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP LAW AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
In light of possible billionaire-financed litigation targeting media outlets, this 
Note proposes the adoption of a federal anti-SLAPP law.136  Supporters of a federal 
anti-SLAPP law span a variety of industries yet share a common desire to protect 
defendants exercising their free speech and petition rights from the chilling effect of 
strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) aimed solely at intimidating 
and silencing defendants.  The goal of SLAPPs is not to win on the merits, but to 
discourage defendants from enjoying their First Amendment rights through the threat 
of devastatingly expensive litigation.137  Anti-SLAPP laws combat SLAPPs by 
offering defendants important procedural protections.  On the most basic level, 
Thiel’s and VanderSloot’s actions can be characterized as SLAPPs.  Their clear 
intentions to deter and to exact revenge on specific media outlets through expensive, 
targeted litigation mirror the intentions of SLAPP plaintiffs, generally.  Given the 
precedent they set by inflicting harm on media defendants through financing 
litigation or allegedly creating funds to do so, a federal anti-SLAPP law emerges as 
a promising solution to protect media outlets at risk for similar actions in the future. 
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A. ANTI-SLAPP LAW ORIGINS 
In response to a rise in lawsuits seeking large civil damages from environmental 
protection advocates and organizations, Penelope Canan and George W. Pring began 
studying litigation arising from “citizen contact with a government official, agency, 
or the electorate on a substantive issue of public significance.”138  In essence, they 
analyzed a trend involving individuals sued for activities long considered to be 
acceptable public participation.  Such activities included, among other things, writing 
editorials, speaking at town meetings, taking part in referendums, reporting health 
violations to officials, and engaging in peaceful demonstrations.139  Canan and Pring 
coined the phrase “strategic lawsuit against public participation” abbreviated as 
“SLAPP,” to describe the phenomenon.140 
Canan and Pring reached a number of conclusions regarding SLAPP lawsuits.  
Specifically, they found that four features characterize SLAPPs.  These include:  a 
civil claim for money damages, defendants who are nongovernmental individuals 
and organizations, claims based on advocacy before a government branch official or 
the electorate, and advocacy dealing with a substantive issue of public or societal 
significance.141  SLAPP lawsuits share not only a lack of merit, but an intention to 
silence and intimidate critics by subjecting them to litigation’s time and money 
requirements.  SLAPPs chill public participation by effectively conveying the 
message “shut up or be sued.”142  To combat SLAPP lawsuits, states began enacting 
anti-SLAPP laws that provide SLAPP defendants with certain protections. 
B. CONTEMPORARY ANTI-SLAPP LAW CONTEXT 
Since the state of Washington enacted the first anti-SLAPP law in 1989, thirty-
one states, along with the District of Columbia and Guam, have passed anti-SLAPP 
laws.143  These laws differ from state to state, but they typically include a few similar 
features.  Anti-SLAPP laws usually provide defendants with an expedited process to 
dismiss the case, with little or no discovery, and they afford fee-shifting measures.144  
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A comparison of a few state anti-SLAPP laws reveals the extent to which the scope 
of activity they cover can vary.  For example, New York’s anti-SLAPP law offers 
narrow protection.  It provides a special motion to strike a cause of action against a 
person arising from speech that comments on, rules on, or contests an application or 
permission by the government.145  This law covers individuals who have applied for 
or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, or other entitlement for use or 
permission to act.146 
California’s anti-SLAPP law, on the other hand, offers expansive protection.  Its 
law provides a special motion to strike a cause of action against a person “arising 
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free 
speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue” unless the court determines that there is a probability 
that the plaintiff will prevail on his or her claim.147  The statute covers written or oral 
statements made before a government body or official proceeding, statements made 
in connection with an issue under consideration by a government body, and written 
or oral statements made in public on an issue of public interest.  It also covers any 
other conduct concerning petition or free speech in connection with an issue of public 
interest.148  As follows, the scope of activity covered can vary greatly from state to 
state.   
While Canan and Pring’s initial conception of SLAPPs referred to threats to the 
right to petition, the term’s connotation has since expanded to include lawsuits 
intended to intimidate and silence critics exercising First Amendment rights to speak 
and publish as well.149  For example, the increasing popularity of online reviews has 
fueled many contemporary SLAPP lawsuits.150  In response, Yelp established a 
political office in Washington, D.C. committed to forming a coalition to lobby for a 
federal anti-SLAPP law.151 
Additionally, federal courts disagree on whether state anti-SLAPP laws apply in 
federal court for diversity actions.152  A variety of scholarship exists both for and 
against application of these state laws at the federal level.153  Some argue that state 
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anti-SLAPPs directly conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, and 
thus should not apply in federal court.154  Others believe that applying state anti-
SLAPP laws in federal court aligns with Erie’s twin aims by “removing the incentive 
for filers to shop for a federal forum in order to evade anti-SLAPP protections, and 
by preventing the inequitable treatment of targets’ legitimate petitioning activity.”155  
A federal anti-SLAPP would eliminate strategic forum-shopping by SLAPP 
plaintiffs and establish uniformity by providing media outlets with an important 
weapon regardless of where SLAPP suits are filed.   
C. WHAT SHOULD A FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP LAW LOOK LIKE? 
1. The SPEAK FREE Act of 2015 
In May 2015, a bipartisan coalition in the House of Representatives introduced 
the “Securing Participation, Engagement, and Knowledge Freedom by Reducing 
Egregious Efforts Act of 2015,” also known as the SPEAK FREE Act, in an effort 
to enact a federal anti-SLAPP law.156  With more than thirty co-sponsors, it was the 
third anti-SLAPP bill introduced.157  The SPEAK FREE Act provides a solid 
blueprint for an effective federal anti-SLAPP law solution that I will build upon 
below.   
The SPEAK FREE Act effectively provides a mechanism for federal courts to 
quickly dispose of meritless lawsuits intended to silence individuals for exercising 
their First Amendment rights.  The Act received support from fifty organizations that 
spanned various industries including The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Glassdoor, 
Media Law Resource Center, Public Participation Project, SnapChat, and Yelp.158  
In addition, over 100 organizations and businesses support federal anti-SLAPP 
legislation in general.159 
The SPEAK FREE Act defines a “SLAPP suit” as a “claim that arises from an 
oral or written statement or other expression, or conduct in furtherance of such 
expression, by the person against whom the claim is asserted that was made in 
connection with an official proceeding or about a matter of public concern.”160  This 
broad definition covers a range of activity and essentially protects any speech or 
conduct connected to a matter of public concern.  The Act delivers a number of 
features including quick dismissal of SLAPP suits, removal to district court, a stay 
of discovery, and an award of attorney’s fees.161 
Specifically, the Act provides a special motion to dismiss if the filing party 
“makes a prima facie showing that the claim at issue arises from an oral or written 
statement or other expression by the defendant that was made in connection with an 
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official proceeding or about a matter of public concern” unless the responding party 
shows that the claim is likely to succeed on the merits.162  The Act provides three 
exceptions.  Specifically, enforcement actions, commercial speech, and public 
interest are exempt from the special motion option.163 
Motions to dismiss must be filed within forty-five days if the claim is filed initially 
in federal court, or within thirty days after the date of removal if the claim is filed 
initially in state court and removed.164  Hearings must be held no later than thirty 
days after a special motion to dismiss is served, and no less than ninety days after the 
special motion to dismiss is served if the hearing must be postponed.165  These 
requirements guarantee a speedy resolution of the anti-SLAPP dispute.   
Furthermore, the Act provides for a stay of discovery unless there is a showing of 
good cause for specific discovery.166  Aggrieved parties may make an intermediate 
interlocutory appeal and cases can be removed from state to federal district court.167  
The Act also provides attorneys’ fees to the party that files and prevails on a motion 
to dismiss or a motion to quash based on personally identifying information sought 
in connection with a claim.168  While the SPEAK FREE Act ultimately was not 
signed into law, it provides the building blocks for an effective federal anti-SLAPP 
law. 
2. Important Features to Include in Future Bills 
This section builds upon the blueprint established by the SPEAK FREE Act of 
2015.  It begins with an analysis of the concerns raised during and after the June 22, 
2016 hearing on the Act and culminates in a proposal for a viable federal anti-SLAPP 
solution that includes specific features. 
a. A Broad SLAPP Definition with Specific Exceptions 
A federal anti-SLAPP bill that includes a broad SLAPP definition, as well as 
specific exceptions, is necessary for striking the proper balance between protecting 
opposing parties’ First Amendment rights and their access to the courts.  Crafting a 
suitable definition inevitably requires walking a fine line.  By defending one person’s 
freedom of speech, an anti-SLAPP law can run the risk of intruding on the opposing 
person’s “right to petition.”169  Indeed, an overly broad SLAPP definition can 
undermine anti-SLAPP’s goal of preventing retaliatory lawsuits against individuals 
exercising their First Amendment rights. 
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SPEAK FREE Act critics argued that its broad scope and narrow exceptions might 
undermine legitimate lawsuits including those pursuing cases to “enforce civil rights, 
stop employment discrimination, blow the whistle on fraud, ensure fair competition, 
and protect copyright.”170  Professor Reinert of Cardozo Law School argued that the 
bill’s SLAPP definition might cover speech and conduct not protected by the First 
Amendment and threaten important cases not traditionally considered SLAPP suits, 
such as those brought by individual plaintiffs against powerful government or private 
interests.171  Representative John Conyers, Jr. went so far as to describe the bill as 
“yet another measure intended to severely impede the ability of those with legitimate 
claims to obtain justice in court.”172 
Critics also voiced concerns about the bill’s “matter of public concern” definition.  
In particular, the bill provides that a defendant in any lawsuit that “arises from” 
expression or an act in furtherance of such expression “in connection with an official 
proceeding or about a matter of public concern” can file a “special motion to dismiss 
the lawsuit.”173  The bill defines “matter of public concern” generously, including 
under its umbrella any issue related to “health or safety,” “environmental, economic, 
or community well-being,” “the government,” “a public official or public figure;” or 
“a good, product, or service in the marketplace.”174  Critics specifically disapproved 
of the definition’s over-expansiveness, arguing that it could potentially apply to a 
sexual harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.175 
An improved definition of SLAPP lawsuits with a narrower definition of “matter 
of public concern” and more specific exemptions should be included in future bills 
to assuage critics’ fears.  Expanding and tailoring the public interest exception to the 
community at risk is one possible improvement.176  Exempting certain types of 
lawsuits like employment discrimination, securities fraud, antitrust, whistleblower, 
and products liability cases can prevent the application of special motions to dismiss 
in unintended cases.177 
While a definition that is too broad can pose problems, a broader definition, like 
California’s, as opposed to New York’s, is essential to cover the activity at issue in 
the media context.  For example, the federal anti-SLAPP law could learn from 
California’s experience.  California enacted § 425.17 to address abuse of its anti-
SLAPP law.  Section 425.17 prohibits anti-SLAPP motions in response to public 
interest litigation when certain conditions are met.  It also prohibits anti-SLAPP 
motions in actions against a business arising from commercial statements or business 
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conduct.178  In this way, California’s statute provides SLAPP defendants protections 
for a wide array of First Amendment activities while striving to prevent abuse. 
It has been suggested that anti-SLAPP laws should define protected activity in 
such a way that explicitly limits potential media abuse, such as “allowing protection 
for only true, lawful and legitimately achieved information” to fulfill the purpose of 
protecting “citizen participation in government.”179  Yet, because the “actual malice” 
standard does not require that information published be true, this definition would 
interfere too much with the protected activity of media outlets.  Tailoring the “matter 
of public concern” definition and including exemptions to cover unintended cases 
that can inadvertently fall within the federal anti-SLAPP realm would improve the 
law’s definition while balancing the competing interests of opposing parties. 
b. A Pleading Standard that Avoids Both Vagueness Concerns and a 7th 
Amendment Conflict 
A standard for dismissal that gets rid of clearly frivolous lawsuits without too 
much of a burden on the plaintiff that filed the original lawsuit is crucial in the digital 
media context.  Of course, a standard that places a higher burden on plaintiffs than 
does the summary judgment standard raises concerns.  To ensure the bill’s passage, 
lawmakers should adopt a standard to avoid dismissal that is no higher than the 
summary judgment standard.180  Alternatively, lawmakers can implement the 
standard provided by California’s anti-SLAPP law. 
The SPEAK FREE Act’s requirement that a court grant a special motion to 
dismiss the SLAPP claim unless the plaintiff shows that she is “likely to succeed on 
the merits” of her claim upset lawmakers who asserted that it was a burden too 
difficult to meet without discovery, even for meritorious claims.181  Lawmakers have 
emphasized that such a burden is higher than that required in a regular motion to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 
and 56.182  Moreover, the likelihood of success standard may be unconstitutional in 
comparison to the summary judgment standard.  Specifically, the “well-worn 
standard after summary judgment” is that a plaintiff, after discovery, must only show 
that a reasonable jury could find in her favor.183  The SPEAK FREE Act’s standard, 
on the other hand, envisions courts determining the likelihood of success, a higher 
burden of proof, without access to an evidentiary record.  This discrepancy proves 
problematic when filtering claims in federal court before discovery.184 
Furthermore, a special motion to dismiss with a likelihood of success burden of 
proof may be inherently vague and require the judge to commandeer the jury’s role 
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in making its determination.185  Specifically, this standard seems to require judges to 
engage in tasks traditionally assigned to the jury, like making factual determinations, 
weighing evidence, and assessing the evidence’s credibility.  As such, it risks 
violating the Seventh Amendment.186  If, on the other hand, the standard merely 
requires judges to determine whether enough evidence has been offered to satisfy 
each element of the claim or whether any reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
petitioner, then it passes muster.187  A future bill must provide greater clarity 
regarding what its standard requires.  Moreover, to withstand the aforementioned 
criticisms, a future bill should set a standard to avoid dismissal that is no higher than 
the summary judgment standard, or implement California’s requirement that a 
plaintiff need only show that there is a “probability that the plaintiff will prevail.”188 
c. A Removal Provision that Includes Explicit Conditions 
Because state anti-SLAPP laws vary greatly, SLAPP plaintiffs can make strategic 
forum choices and capitalize on legal vulnerabilities, including disparate or non-
existent anti-SLAPP laws throughout the country.189  This was the case with Mother 
Jones since Idaho had no state anti-SLAPP law.  A removal provision is necessary 
to establish uniformity and combat the strategic efforts of SLAPP plaintiffs.  Further, 
digital media’s reach, which by nature crosses state lines, underscores the importance 
of a uniformly applicable removal provision that eliminates strategic forum-
shopping. 
The SPEAK FREE Act’s removal provision upset critics due to its federalism 
implications.  Critics explained that a minority of states had chosen not to enact anti-
SLAPP laws190 and they emphasized that this choice represents the experimentation 
that federalism intends to promote.191  Including a removal provision may therefore 
encroach on the fundamental federal-state balance.192  Further, a removal provision 
can motivate reverse forum-shopping for targets sued in states without anti-SLAPP 
statutes who can now gain access to federal court.193  Allowing the removal of purely 
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state-law claims to federal court in the absence of diversity jurisdiction or a federal 
question may also exceed the bounds of Article III of the Constitution.194 
On the other hand, supporters of the bill argued for the constitutionality of its 
removal provision.  In his Prepared Statement, Jeremy B. Rosen, a partner at Horvitz 
& Levy LLP, explained that Congress has the authority to decide the cases federal 
courts can consider, as long as Congress remains within Article III bounds. Rosen 
clarified that according to Article III, “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and equity, arising under this Constitution….”195  Because Article III’s 
“arising under” jurisdiction “may extend to all cases in which a federal question is 
‘an ingredient’ of the action,”196 as long as the claims covered by the removal 
provision incorporate a federal question, Congress can properly grant courts the 
jurisdiction to hear these claims.  The SPEAK FREE Act’s removal provision § 
4206(a) covers claims under § 4201.197  Because § 4201’s claims arise in whole or 
in part from free speech and petitioning activities protected by the First Amendment, 
the removal provision properly covers claims that incorporate a federal question.198 
Because the provision allows removal when the application of First Amendment 
rights and defenses will be raised in the action, Bruce D. Brown of the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, argued that the provision’s plain language is 
proper because it implies that a defendant must show proper reasons for removal in 
her petition for removal if the complaint does not clearly declare them.199  Brown 
acknowledged that the provision’s text does not explicitly state this reality so he 
suggested a modification that can quell critics’ concerns.  Specifically, he explained 
that the provision could be revised to state the following:  “The grounds for removal 
provided in this section need not appear on the face of the complaint but may be 
shown in the petition for removal by asserting that the civil action may be defeated 
by a defense arising under the First Amendment.”200  According to Brown, this 
revision “is not necessary to preserve the removal provision’s constitutional validity, 
[but] it may further illuminate the intent of Congress.”201 
For these reasons, a future removal provision should explicitly state a number of 
things.  Specifically, it should clearly restrict removal of cases to those that involve 
federal defenses, like the First Amendment, so that removed cases unambiguously 
raise a federal question for jurisdictional purposes.202  And a removal provision 
should include language addressing the First Amendment to alleviate critics’ 
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concerns regarding the potential for removing purely state law claims in the absence 
of diversity jurisdiction.  Limiting removal to claims founded on federal law, 
diversity clams, or claims in which a First Amendment defense is raised, prevents 
jurisdictional deficiencies. 
d. An Enumerated Commerce Clause Hook 
An enumerated Commerce Clause hook would unambiguously verify federal anti-
SLAPP law drafters’ authority to enact such a law.203  In particular, the Commerce 
Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate the channels and instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, as well as economic activities that “substantially impact” 
interstate commerce.204  Traditional and new media’s activities and reach support the 
argument that lawsuits targeting these media defendants substantially affect the 
interstate commerce of communications.  A similar argument can also be made 
regarding the activities and reach of online review sites.  Hard-copy news circulation 
crosses state lines and access to digital news and online reviews appears ubiquitous.  
As follows, lawsuits targeting media companies and online reviewers implicate 
interstate commerce and threaten national media and online review markets.  Thus, 
these suits encompass some of the “activities” that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to regulate. 
It is more difficult to argue that lawsuits targeting individual SLAPP defendants 
petitioning local government substantially threaten interstate commerce.  However, 
under Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court determined that Congress has the 
authority to regulate an entire class of activities if it “decides that the ‘total incidence’ 
of a practice poses a threat to a national market.”205  If one can argue that lawsuits 
targeting these petitioners in the aggregate affect interstate commerce and thereby 
threaten some national market, then a Commerce Clause hook could sweep in not 
only the media lawsuits central to this Note, but also lawsuits involving other forms 
of free speech and petitioning activities. 
At the least, a federal anti-SLAPP law should include a hook that explains 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.  The hook should specifically detail the interstate commerce of 
communications that is relevant in this context and illuminate why meritless lawsuits 
targeting media defendants constitute a type of activity that Congress can regulate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A strong federal anti-SLAPP law would provide vital protection for media 
defendants at risk for future actions similar to Thiel’s and VanderSloot’s.  An 
effective federal anti-SLAPP law would build on the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015’s 
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blueprint and include the following features:  (1) a broad SLAPP definition with 
specific exceptions, (2) a pleading standard that avoids both vagueness concerns and 
a 7th Amendment conflict, (3) a removal provision that includes explicit conditions, 
and (4) an enumerated commerce clause hook.  A federal anti-SLAPP law with these 
features would offer an avenue by which media defendants hit with baseless SLAPP 
lawsuits can avoid the high costs of litigation.  Such a law would provide uniformity 
nationwide, eliminate strategic forum-shopping by SLAPP plaintiffs, and help media 
outlets without the deep pockets of their older, more traditional counterparts.  
Further, it would level the playing field between opposing parties, a possibility 
especially important in the digital age where many media outlets, print and post-print 
alike, struggle financially.  A federal anti-SLAPP law would not throw out all 
lawsuits against the media.  However, it could prevent extensive time and resource 
loss by disposing of meritless lawsuits modeled on and inspired by Thiel’s and 
VanderSloot’s efforts. 
 
